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In Commissioner v. Culbertson, the Supreme Court referred to the
assignment of income doctrine as "the first principle of income taxa-
tion: that income must be taxed to him who earns it."' The person
earning the income-whether a corporation, partnership or an individ-.
ual taxpayer---"cannot avoid taxation by entering into a contractual ar-
rangement whereby that income is diverted to some other person or
entity."2 The doctrine, whose boundaries are yet without precise de-
lineation, arose in the 1930 case of Lucas v. Earl. In that case, an
attorney and his wife entered into a contract which provided, in es-
sence, that any income which either might acquire would be treated as
"received, held, taken, and owned by us as joint tenants. . . ."I The
controversy arose over proper treatment of the salary and attorney's
fees received by Mr. Earl from his law practice. Although Mrs. Earl
was not a party to the contracts under which those amounts were paid,
the salary and fees, when received by Mr. Earl, were reported one-half
by himself and one-half by her. The Supreme Court held that the Rev-
enue Acts of 1918 and 1921 "tax[ed] salaries to those who earned them
* Associate Professor of Law, Hamline University; B.S., 1967, University of Notre Dame;
J.D. cum laude, 1970, Duke University; LL.M. (Taxation), 1981, University of Florida. The au-
thor acknowledges the excellent critique and editing provided by his former research assistant,
Ms. Cynthia L. Lehr, J.D. cum laude, 1981, Hamline University.
1. 337 U.S. 733, 739-40 (1940).
2. United States v. Bayse, 410 U.S. 441, 449 (1973).
3. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
4. Id. at 114. The contract was valid under state law.
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and the tax could not be avoided by anticipatory arrangements and
contracts."5 The Court reasoned that the statute did not allow an "ar-
rangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from
that on which they grew."'6 No further rationale was given for the
decision.
Since the decision in Lucas v. Earl, the courts have struggled with the
application of the assignment of income doctrine in other contexts, in-
cluding that of the personal service corporation.7 The tension between
separate taxation of the two taxable persons and unitary taxation of the
single economic unit is most acute where the corporation has a sole, or
very few shareholders.3 Analysis of cases in this area is clouded by (1)
the intensely factual nature of the inquiry and (2) the almost inevitable
joining of the assignment of income doctrine with other theories in the
Commissioner's attacks on these arrangements.
There are three lines of attack used by the Commissioner in personal
service corporation cases. The corporation may be so lacking in opera-
tional characteristics that it is a mere "sham" to be disregarded for tax
purposes.9 The corporation may lack sufficient direction and control
over the earning of the income so that the shareholder is deemed to
have attempted to assign his own income to the corporation.' 0 Finally,
the Commissioner may exercise his discretion pursuant to Section 482 t"
and allocate income from the corporation to its shareholder.' 2
Initially, the Commissioner's approach was to use the sham and as-
signment of income theories in tandem. This approach was eventually
5. Id. at 115.
6. Id.
7. See generaly Battle, The Use of Corporations by Persons Who Perform Services to Gain
Tax Advantages, 57 TAXES 797 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Battle]; Burdett, Foglesong's Sec. 482
Approach May Threaten Closely-Held Personal Service Corporations, 53 J. TAX. 330 (1980) [here-
inafter cited as Burdett]; Kauder, The Service Corporation as the Taxpayer's Alter Ego. Variations
on the Borge Theme, N.Y.U. 28TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1109 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Kauder].
8. Kauder states that "the personal service corporation owned by a single shareholder
would not exist but for the tax laws." Supra, note 7, at 1109. The Internal Revenue Service's
efforts to reassign income to the shareholder presents a serious obstacle to use of the corporate
form by physicians, accountants, attorneys, and other service providers. See Egerton, Reallocation
of Income: A New Threat to Professional Corporations?, 58 A.B.A. J. 979 (1972).
9. See Shaw Construction Company v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1102 (1961). See generally
Bittker, ProfessionalAssociation and Federal Income Tax, 17 TAx L. REV. 1, 5 at n.8 (1961); Eus-
tice, Tax Problems Arising From Transactions Between Affhated or Controlled Corporations, 23
TAX L. REv. 451, 458-59 (1968); [hereinafater cited as Eustice]; Hobbet, The Corporate Entity
When Will It Be Recognizedfor Federal Tax Purposes?, 30 J. TAX. 74 (1969).
10. See Jones v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1066 (1975). The leading United States Supreme
Court cases concerning the general doctrine of assignment of income are summarized in Wood v.
Harmon Corp. v. United States, 311 F.2d 918, 921-922 (2d Cir. 1963).
11. I.R.C. §482.
12. See Rubin v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1155 (1971) (opinion on remand), a 'dper curiam,
460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972) (Rubin III). See generally Battle, supra note 7, at 
805-06; Burdett,
supra note 7, at 332-36.
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accepted by the Tax Court. If the corporation was a "sham," the in-
quiry ended. If not, the assignment of income doctrine was applied. In
the 1970's, 13 the Commissioner began to avoid the sham approach and
to concentrate his attacks under the assignment of income doctrine with
allocation pursuant to Section 482 as a backup theory. Neither the
courts nor the Commissioner, however, were always clear with regard
to the theory being used.14 In 1970, a panel of the Second Circuit, in
Rubin v. Commissioner,15 (hereinafter referred to as Rubin fl) held that
use of the assignment of income doctrine under Section 6116 was error
"where . . .there is a statutory provision [Section 482] adequate to
deal with the problem presented."' 7 After Rubin II the Commissioner
and the Tax Court continued to apply the assignment of income doc-
trine in these cases."8
On April 25, 1980, the Service issued a Technical Advice Memoran-
dum 19 in which it reaffirmed its assignment of income doctrine attack
on certain personal service corporations. The stated rationale was as
follows:
It has long been established that income must be taxed to the per-
son who earned it, irrespective of whether he actually received it or
rather assigned the rights to receive it to some person.
Where a small, closely-held corporation is involved, however, the
issue may be complicated by the fact that the corporation can act
only through agents who are likely to be its controlling shareholders.
Nonetheless, so long as the corporation itself in fact earns the in-
come, the corporation will be taxed .... But where the share-
holder-employee, in fact, acts on his own behalf rather than for the
13. In a prior collateral approach to tliis general issue the Internal Revenue Service issued
T.I.R. 1019, [1969] 7 Stand Fed Tax.Rep. (CCH) § 6867 (Aug. 8, 1969), in which it conceded that
professional corporations would, except where "special circumstances" were present, be consid-
ered to be within the definition of "corporations" for federal tax purposes under I.R.C.
§7701(a)(3). See note 137 infra. The "sham" corporation is an example of such a "special circum-
stance." Jones v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1066 (1975).
14. See Morrison v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 758 (1970).
15. 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970) (remk' 51 T.C. 251 (1968)) (Rubin II).
16. I.R.C. §61(a). In the earlier cases, the statutory basis for the assignment of income doc-
trine is Internal Revenue Code of 1939, C.A, §22a, 53 Stat. 9 and Revenue Act of 1913, §213(a),
38 Stat. 114. All of these provisions have the same meaning although their specific terms differ
slightly. S. REP. No. 1622, 83D CONG. 2D SESS. 168 (1954).
17. Rubin v. Commissioner, 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970) (Rubin II). Judge Friendly clearly
thought that Section 482 did apply in order for the assignment of income doctrine to be pre-
empted. Battle, supra note 7, at 804. See Rubin v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1155 (Rubin III) apply-
ing Section 482 to cause the shareholder-employee to include in gross income the amounts
received by the corporation for his services to a third party.
18. See Shaw v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 375, 387 (1972) (concurring opinion); American Sav-
ings Bank v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 828 (1971). Bittker and Eustice state in their treatise that
"[tihese assignment-of-income principles [from Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930)] apply with
equal force to corporate transactions." B. BITTKER & J. EusTicE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, §1.05, at 1-19 (4th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Birr-
KER & EUSTiCE].
19. [1980] Letter Rulings (CCH) §6971K. (Apr. 25, 1980).
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corporation, he and not the corporation must bear the burden of tax
S. .. If the corporation involved is admittedly a separate taxable
entity and not a mere sham, the issue has generally been narrowed to
whether the corporation has been given sufficient corporate sub-
stance and sufficient control over the earning of the income so that it,
and not the individual taxpayer, can be considered the true earner of
the income . 20
Four days later, on April 29, 1980, a panel of the Seventh Circuit issued
an opinion which deemed the assignment of income doctrine "inappro-
priate" in personal service corporation situations where Section 482
could be applied."1 Thus, the two Courts of Appeal (Second and Sev-
enth Circuits) to consider the issue have both determined that Section
482 should preempt the assignment of income doctrine whenever that
section is applicable.
This article will trace the development of the Tax Court's sham and
assignment of income approaches to the problem of income allocation
in the context of the personal service corporation. It will discuss the
Courts of Appeal cases favoring the use of Section 482 in this situation.
The propriety of the assignment of income doctrine approach will be
considered and contrasted with use of Section 482. Finally, a legisla-
tive solution will be suggested.
THE TAX COURT CASES
The Tax Court cases fall into two categories representing the earlier
approaches to the "true earner" problem in the personal service corpo-
ration-the sham doctrine and the assignment of income doctrine.22
These cases are set forth in Table I in the Appendix. The Table pro-
vides an overview of the theoretical development from 1938 to 1976 by
identifying the approaches used and the factors thought significant by
the courts.
A. The Sham Doctrine
The sham doctrine traces its roots to Moline Properties Inc. v. Com-
missioner.? The corporation there involved was organized for use as a
security device in connection with loans made by a third party to the
taxpayer.2 4 The Commissioner's attack was based solely on the conten-
20. Id.
21. Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980), rem'g, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1309
(1976) (Foglesong 11).
22. The later Tax Court cases applying Section 482 are discussed infra.
23. 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
24. Certain real property was transferred to the corporation and the taxpayer's stock in the
corporation (which constituted all outstanding shares) was placed in a voting trust controlled by
the creditor. The corporation assumed certain obligations with respect to the property, defended
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tion that the corporation was a mere agent which should be disregarded
for tax purposes because of its limited purpose (to provide a means to
secure a particular loan). After stating that the corporate form may
generally be disregarded for tax purposes if it is "a sham or unreal," the
court decided:
so long as that purpose [for creating the corporation] is the
equivalent of business activity or is followed by the carrying on of
business by the corporation, the corporation remains a separate taxa-
ble entity.'
In that case, the corporation had performed an important business
function required by third parties to the transaction.
Since Moline Properties, a functional test for corporate vitality has
developed from the cases. As one commentator notes:
Neither the identity of economic interest between the corporation
and its sole shareholder nor a tax motivation for the corporation's
creation and use will defeat the corporate existence if the corporation
actually engages in some business activity of a relatively continuous
26nature.
In Bass v. Commissioner,27 the Tax Court looked to whether the pur-
pose for creation of the corporation was "intended to be accomplished
through a corporation carrying out substantive business functions. 28
In Shaw Construction Company v. Commissioner,29 the construction
company formed some 79 corporations to hold one or two lots which
the construction company's shareholder had arranged to acquire and
develop. The shareholder assigned VA loans to the construction com-
pany which built homes on the lots owned by the 79 companies. The
homes were then sold and the proceeds received by the respective cor-
porate "seller." The multiple companies had no separate offices, no
employees, no payroll, no furniture or equipment and no real business
function. Each company had separate books which were kept by an
employee of the construction company. The court found the multiple
corporations to be "shams" and not recognizable for tax purposes.
Thus, all the income received by them was deemed income to the con-
its interests in a condemnation suit and instituted suit to remove restrictions imposed on the prop-
erty by a prior owner.
25. 319 U.S. at 439.
26. Kauder, supra note 7, at 1122. See Note, 4 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 958 (1970).
27. 50 T.C. 595 (1968). In Bass, the corporation not only looked like one, it also acted like
one. See Roubik v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 365, 381 (1969) (concurring opinion); Eustice, supra
note 9, at 458; 39 U. CIN. L. REv. 396 (1970).
28. 50 T.C. at 601.
29. 35 T.C. 1102 (1961). Accord Kimbrell v. Commissioner, 371 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1967).
See Noonan v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 907, 910 (1969) wherein the Court stated "the bones of
these corporations were without flesh... [t]hey were paper corporations that existed in form only
for the purpose of obtaining tax benefits available by splitting the income" of the larger economic
entity.
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struction company.30
The functional nature of the sham doctrine is illustrated by Jones v.
Commissioner3 in which the Tax Court found that the corporation was
not organized for a legitimate purpose (it was designed for tax avoid-
ance) but that it was not a "sham" because it nevertheless engaged in
substantial business activity. In Estate of Cole v. Commissioner,32 the
court appeared to add a new element to the factual mix in sham cases
when it looked at whether the corporation was bearing entrepreneurial
risk. In all, the sham cases make it clear that more than dejure corpo-
rate status under state law and possession of a certificate of incorpora-
tion3 3 are needed to achieve status as a separate taxable entity or
"person" 34 for purposes of the federal income tax. The exact quantum
of business functions required, however, is rather low, and the Com-
missioner increasingly appears to be conceding this issue to the
taxpayer.3 5
B. The Assignment of Income Doctrine
Although frequently joined with the sham theory in the Commis-
sioner's contentions, the assignment of income doctrine is inconsistent
with the sham doctrine. For there to be an assignment of income, there
must first be at least two taxable persons. In Lucas v. Earl, the separate
taxable persons were Mr. Earl and his wife. In the personal service
corporation cases, the separate taxable persons are the corporation and
its sole shareholder. The assignment of income doctrine, if applied,
merely results in a determination that the corporation did not "earn"
the income in question in the the taxable year under examination. Ap-
plication of the doctrine does not affect the corporation's status as a
separate taxable entity. In Jones v. Commissioner,36 the court noted:
Recognition of a corporation as a viable tax entity does not com-
pletely bridge petitioners' journey over the pitfalls of section 61(a)
because petitioners' scheme was no more than an assignment of in-
come earned by Mr. Jones. 37
30. The court also found that the construction company which took all of the major steps
necessary to create the income and which controlled its disposition was the "true earner" under
the assignment of income doctrine.
31. 64 T.C. 1066 (1975).
32. 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 313 (1973).
33. Issuance of such a certificate by the Secretary of State (or other appropriate official) is
enerally conclusive evidence of corporate existence against all but the State. See MINN. STAT.
302A.155.
34. I.R.C. §7701(a)(1) includes both individuals and corporations as "persons" for purposes
of tax law.
35. See Battle, supra note 7, at 803. See generally Schwartz, Meeting 4ttacks on the Profes.
sional Corporation, N.Y.U. 32ND INST. ON FED. TAx. 859 (1974).
36. 64 T.C. 1066 (1975).
37. Id. at 1076.
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The first personal service corporation case to reach the Tax Court
was Fox v. Commissioner,38 decided a mere eight years after the birth of
the assignment of income doctrine in Lucas v. Earl. In Fox, the tax-
payer had been a successful cartoonist for a number of years. He
formed a corporation to market the cartoons which he would subse-
quently create as an employee of the corporation. He agreed to render
his exclusive services as an artist and author to the corporation. In ad-
dition, he agreed to approve contracts which the corporation was later
to make for syndication of his work in newspapers. The shareholder,
as president of the corporation, entered into contracts for newspaper
syndication of the cartoons. Under these contracts, the corporation re-
ceived three (3) times the amount which it was required to pay over to
the shareholder-employee under his employment contract. The royal-
ties from the syndication contracts were paid directly to the corpora-
tion. The corporation employed clerical employees to assist the
shareholder-employee in preparing the cartoons.
The Commissioner attempted to charge the income to the share-
holder-employee arguing first, the sham theory and second, the assign-
ment of income theory. The Board of Tax Appeals, after noting that
the separate identity of the corporation had been generally respected by
the cartoonist and by those who had dealings with it, such as the news-
paper syndicates, found that there was no factual basis for application
of the sham doctrine to disregard the corporation as a separate taxable
entity. With respect to the assignment of income attack, the Board felt
that the facts before it did not come within the purview of the decision
in Lucas v. Earl.39 The Board was impressed by the lack of contractual
relationship between the shareholder-employee and the newspaper syn-
dicates as well as by a concession by the Commissioner that no assign-
ment of future earnings was involved in any of the contracts. It is
difficult to understand the Commissioner's concession with respect to
assignment of future earnings in view of his basic contention that an
assignment of income had occurred. The failure of the Board to deal
with this apparent inconsistency weakens the resulting opinion. In
Fox, there was no attempt to explore in detail the activities of the
corporation qua corporation with regard to generation of the income
from the syndication contracts. The Tax Court faced another personal
service corporation problem in Laughton v. Commissioner' when the
taxpayer, a successful actor, formed a corporation for the purpose of
engaging in the motion picture and theatrical business. The actor was
38. 37 B.T.A. 271 (1938).
39. Id. at 277.
40. 40 B.T.A. 101 (1939), rem'd, 113 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1940).
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not a member of the Board of Directors nor was he an officer of the
company, although he owned all of the shares. He entered into a con-
tract to provide exclusive services to the corporation for a period of five
years in return for compensation of $750 per week. The corporation
subsequently entered into contracts with various motion picture studios
whereby it "loaned" its employee to the studio for the purposes of act-
ing in pictures." For this use of its employee's services, the corporation
received compensation substantially in excess of the amounts which it
was required to pay the shareholder-employee. This "loan-out" ar-
rangement was in accordance with the general practice in the industry
where one studio or producer had a long-term contract for the services
of an actor.
The Commissioner sought to tax the shareholder-employee directly
on the income generated under the "loan-out" contract. The Commis-
sioner argued that the Board should disregard the corporate form and
determine that the corporation was organized merely as a tax avoid-
ance scheme.42
The Board viewed the Commissioner's attack as a melange of sham
doctrine, agency concepts, tax avoidance objections, and perhaps an
assignment of income doctrine attack. 43 The Board determined, prima-
rily by looking at the activities of the corporation in taxable years sub-
sequent to those in question, that the corporation was a functioning
business entity and not a sham. Comparing the case with Fox, the
Board noted that the amounts sought to be taxed to the shareholder-
employee had been received directly by the corporation under con-
tracts between the corporation and the studios. Thus, the Board felt
there was no occasion to apply the assignment of income doctrine.44
In Wilgus v. Commissioner,45 the personal service corporation had
operated for a number of years as an independent poultry processor,
owning its own processing facility and employing a substantial number
41. During the taxable years in question, the corporation apparently engaged in nominal
activities other than the loan-out of the services of its shareholder-employee. The corporation,
however, had been formed as a production company, and in later years, after the corporation had
acquired sufficient capital, it actively engaged in film production.
42. In this regard, the Commissioner asserted that the corporation was merely the agent and
alter ego of its shareholder serving as a conduit for his Hollywood earnings to his London bank
account. Therefore, the agreements between the corporation and the studios should be character-
ized as anticipatory arrangements for the deflection of income.
43. A significant indicator of the Board's view of the case is presented by the comment that
"the answer to the respondent's contentions turns upon whether the corporation should be recog-
nized or disregarded as an entity separate and apart from the petitioner." 40 B.T.A. at 105. Thus,
it appears the Board is viewing the case solely as a "sham" theory case and not as a true assign-
ment of income doctrine case. Under assignment of income principles, the separate existence of
the corporation would be a prerequisite to application of the doctrine.
44. The court of appeals disagreed with this conclusion. See note 82 and accompanying text
infra.
45. 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 752 (1961).
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of persons. As part of an economy move, five poultry processors
formed a new corporation and transferred the physical assets of the
independent corporations to the new entity. All non-executive employ-
ees of the old corporations were fired and then rehired by the new cor-
poration. The new corporation acquired its management by entering
into oral service contracts with the former corporations for the services
of various executives. In the case of Wilgus' corporation, both of the
principal shareholders were "loaned out" under this arrangement. 46
The court focused on the payment by the new corporation directly to
the old corporation without deduction for FICA, withholding tax, or
other amounts normally deducted with respect to an employee. The
Commissioner cited Lucas v. Earl, arguing that the income should be
taxed directly to the individual shareholder and not to the old corpora-
tion. The court, however, found that the principal shareholders contin-
ued to be the employees of the old corporation and that the payments
were income to that corporation. There was no discussion of the fac-
tual predicate for this determination. Specifically, the court did not in-
dicate concern for the change in the nature of the old corporation as it
went from an active poultry processor to a passive provider of the serv-
ices of its principal shareholders.
In Rubin v. Commissioner, 7 (hereinafter referred to as Rubin I) the
taxpayer, as part of an effort to purchase Dorman Mills, entered into a
contract to provide management of Dorman Mills for a four-year pe-
riod. The parties to the contract were Dorman Mills and the predeces-
sor to Park International, Inc. (Park) because at the time that this con-
tract was executed Park was not in existence. Subsequent to the execu-
tion of the contract, the taxpayer caused Park to be incorporated with
70% of its stock being issued to himself. The other shareholders of
Park were the taxpayer's brothers. The taxpayer, as the controlling
shareholder-employee, did not enter into any kind of employment con-
tract with Park, and during the period of time covered by the manage-
ment services contract, he also worked for other corporations. At
various times, Dorman Mills held the taxpayer out as part of its man-
agement by listing him as general manager, and, on at least one occa-
sion, treated a loan between Park and itself as if the taxpayer, not Park,
had advanced the money. Third parties dealing with Dorman Mills
during the period of the management contract viewed the taxpayer as
the key employee of Dorman Mills. These third parties did not know
46. The employees continued to receive their regular salary from the old corporation, and the
new corporation paid a specified sum to the old corporation for executive services.
47. 51 T.C. 251 (1968), rem'd, 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970) (Rubin I).
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of the existence of Park. Between themselves, however, Park and
Dorman Mills generally respected the existence of the corporation and
the status of the taxpayer as an employee of Park. All of the manage-
ment fees received by Park were attributable to services performed for
Dorman Mills by the taxpayer. Park had no employees other than the
taxpayer who were involved in the provision of management services.
The Commissioner did not argue the sham doctrine in Rubin I, con-
ceding that Park was a valid corporation during the years in question.
The Commissioner's approach was to argue that the taxpayer, not the
corporation, in substance earned the income and thus was taxable on
the net income pursuant to Section 61.
The Tax Court divided the legal theories asserted by the Commis-
sioner into two parts. First, it considered whether, in substance, the
taxpayer worked directly for Dorman Mills but occasionally contrib-
uted part of his compensation to Park as capital for use in its other
business. The court determined that there was no business purpose for
the interposition of Park between the taxpayer and his real employer,
Dorman Mills.48 Thus, in substance, the taxpayer worked directly for
Dorman Mills and should be taxed on the net management service in-
come which Park received from Dorman Mills. The court dist-
inguished FoX4 9 and Laughton.50 The substance-over-form issue as
presented in those cases dealt with the validity of the corporation,
whereas in the present case, the inquiry was into the validity of the
specific transaction entered into by the corporation. In Fox and Laugh-
ton, each shareholder-employee was contractually bound to render
services exclusively to his corporation. In Rubin I the taxpayer was not
so bound, and thus had the freedom to work for Park under its man-
agement contract with Dorman Mills or not do so. Therefore, he could
control the earning of income by Park. Furthermore, in the earlier
cases, the corporations had transacted business with independent third
parties, whereas in the present case, the taxpayer not only controlled
the corporation for whom he was purportedly an employee but also the
corporation which had contracted to "borrow" his services. Based on
these differences, the court felt that it was not bound by the prior
decisions."1
Second, the court applied the assignment of income doctrine, noting
that in this instance it was only semantically different from the sub-
48. With respect to this issue, the taxpayer had the burden of proving there was substance or
an economic purpose for casting his transaction in the form he chose, and he failed to do so.
49. 37 B.T.A. 271 (1938).
50. 40 B.T.A. 101 (1939).
51. See 51 T.C. at 267.
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stance-over-form argument presented earlier. This issue turns upon the
question of who has the ultimate direction and control over the earning
of the compensation. If this control lies with the shareholder-employee
who actually performs the services, then he remains taxable on the
earnings from the personal services, whether or not he chooses to divert
the receipt of that compensation to his corporation. The court deter-
mined that the taxpayer had directed and controlled the earning of in-
come. He had negotiated the management services contract before the
entity was incorporated, had continued to work for other organizations
during the period of time covered by the management services contract,
and when it served his interest, had the contract between the corpora-
tion and Dorman Mills terminated without consideration. These facts
demonstrated that the corporation did not control the earning of the
income in question but rather that the individual did. Thus, he must
include these amounts in his gross income.
In Roubik v. Commissioner,53 four physicians formed a corporation
and entered into separate employment agreements with it.54 Notwith-
standing the incorporation and the execution of the employment agree-
ments, the four physicians continued to engage in the practice of
medicine substantially as they had before the corporation was
formed.55
The Commissioner challenged these arrangements on the basis that
the physicians had actually been engaged in the practice of radiology as
partners. The Commissioner did not attack the arrangement on the
sham doctrine but rather based his attack entirely on the assignment of
income doctrine.
The Tax Court defined the issue as "whether petitioners' business
was actually carried on by the incorporated organization or whether it
was carried on outside that organization" citing to the Ninth Circuit
52. Id. at 265-266 citing Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and the Tree as Irri-
gated by the P. G. Lake Case, 17 TAX L. REv. 293, 393 (1962).
53. 53 T.C. 365 (1969).
54. Under the agreements, the physicians purported to agree that the corporation would as-
sign the employee to specific job locations and to specific duties at those locations, that the em-
ployee would devote his entire time and attention exclusively to the medical practice of the
employer, and that the employee would not compete with the employer after termination of
employment.
55. The books of the corporation were kept in such fashion that the income and expenses of
each physician were separated from those of the others and the net income from his "practice"
inured to the benefit of that physician only. The corporation did not enter into any contracts to
provide the service of its "employees" to any of the hospitals, other physicians or patients to whom
its physician-shareholders provided actual service during the period in question and was unknown
to most of these third parties. The corporation did not own any equipment, incur any debts for
rent, office or medical supplies, or services, or pay any salaries, except for those of its physician-
shareholders.
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opinion in Commissioner v. Laughon. 6 The court framed the test as
follows:
[i]n the case of a corporation which provides personal services for a
fee, income is 'earned' by the corporation or by the person who actu-
ally performs the services, whoever has the ultimate direction and
control over the earning of ***[the] compensation. 7
The court determined that the physicians had surrendered control over
their services to the corporation in form only. In substance, each doc-
tor continued his own separate practice with the corporation being used
solely to provide bookkeeping services. Thus, during taxable years in
question, the doctors were not bona fide employees of the corporation.
The court determined that the corporation did not assign any of its
employees to a job location, nor to specific duties, nor did it direct any
of its employees in their professional activities, nor did it control the
quality of its employees' work. Thus, the court held that the corpora-
tion had nothing to do with the earning of the income reported by it
during the years in question. The income, therefore, could not be as-
signed by the physicians to their corporation, and that income was in-
cludable in the gross income of the respective physicians.5 8
American Savings Bank v. Commissioner 9 involved a challenge by
the Commissioner to two arrangements made by the individual taxpay-
ers involved. The two taxpayers controlled American Savings Bank
and had large stockholdings in several other banks. They had also pre-
viously formed a partnership for the purpose of selling insurance to
customers of their banks. The agency contracts with the insurance
companies ran to the partnership and were not assignable without writ-
ten assent of the particular insurance company involved. In 1959, the
two individuals formed a corporation and transferred the insurance
business to it." The operation of the insurance business after the trans-
fer remained substantially the same as it had been before.6" The corpo-
ration never made any distributions to its shareholders, but rather
utilized its net income to retire obligations of its own under notes se-
cured by its bank stock.
The second arrangement challenged by the Commissioner involved a
56. 113 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1940) (rem'g 40 B.T.A. 101 (1939)).
57. 53 T.C. at 379. This is the Rubin I test. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
58. The concurring opinion classified Roubik as a "sham" case notwithstanding the failure of
the Commissioner to raise that contention. Id. at 381. See, Note, 4 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 958
(1970).
59. 53 T.C. 365 (1969).
60. No consent, however, was received from the insurance companies relating to this transfer,
and the insurance companies were not notified of it until shortly before trial.
61. The actulales were made primarily by three unrelated individuals who were officers of
the various banks. These banks' officers were aware of the transfer of the business to the corpora-
tion, and after the transfer, they considered themselves to be agents of the corporation.
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contract between American Savings Bank and the corporation whereby
the corporation agreed to render management services to the bank.
The management services were actually rendered by the two share-
holders of the corporation and consisted of the duties which they had
previously carried out as controlling shareholders of the bank. The
corporation did not pay either of its shareholder-employees for provid-
ing the services nor were there any contracts or other employment
agreements between the corporation and its purported employees.
The grounds of the Commissioner's challenge to these transactions
are unclear at best. He appears to have confused the sham doctrine
with the assignment of income doctrine.6" The Tax Court, however,
saw two separate issues. The court first determined that the corpora-
tion was not a "sham" but rather a valid taxable entity separate from its
shareholders. The court then dealt with the assignment of income
question with regard to each of the arrangements under examination.
With regard to the insurance commissions, the court noted that
nearly all of the income earned by the corporation was generated by
policy sales carried out by the three non-shareholder agents of the cor-
poration. The agency contracts, issued by the insurance companies, au-
thorized the sale of insurance by the corporation and not by its
shareholders as individuals. Thus, the court felt that the corporation
had the power to permit or prohibit the agents from selling insurance.
That being so, the court felt the corporation had earned, through its
agents, the income in question. It was significant that the personal
services which generated the income, i.e., the selling efforts of the bank
officers, were performed by persons who were not the controlling share-
holders of the corporation.63 Such "ordinary" employees would not be
in a position to gain economically from an assignment of income to the
corporation.
With respect to the contract for providing management services to
62. Application of Section 482 was not argued.
63. Cf. Gettler v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 442 (1975). The court therein rejected the
Commissioner's assignment of income doctrine challenge to use of a personal service corporation.
As in American Savings Bank, the corporation in Gettler had other professional-level employees
who generated substantial receipts in addition to those generated by the services of its two share-
holder-employees. Although the Commissioner did not base his challenge to the arrangement on
the sham doctrine, the petitioners apparently chose to fight on that ground. Thus, the issue in the
case was confused in the opinion because the court seemed to believe that a finding that the
corporation carried on an active business leads inevitably to a finding that the corporation earned
the particular income in question. The court's citation to Roubtk and its failure to cite Rubin I,
American Savings Bank or Ronan State Bank supports this view of the opinion. The court also
appears to place weight on the Commissioner's failure to show how the assignment of income
resulted in a significant tax advantage to the petitioners. The quantum of tax advantage resulting
from an assignment of income is, of course, completely irrelevant to the question of whether or not
there has been an assignment of income. The holding in Gettler is weakened by the court's failure
to deal effectively with these issues.
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the bank, the Court looked to its decision in Rubin I for guidance. The
Tax Court again distinguished the traditional "loaned" employee
cases 64 on the basis that the individuals involved in those cases had
been contractually bound to render exclusive services to their em-
ployer-corporations, and because the control of both the "loan-out"
and the "borrowing" corporations by the same shareholder was lacking
in those cases. The American Savings Bank court also identified a third
distinguishing factor: the lack of any showing that the controlling
shareholders were either in the employ of the corporation or acting as
its agents in rendering the management services.65 Since the sharehold-
ers are the individuals who actually performed the services and gener-
ated the income, they are (in the absence of any overriding
employment obligations) the true earners of the income. The share-
holders could have ceased at any time providing the management serv-
ices to the corporation. This ability to control, without legal
impediment, the income flow to the corporation results in taxation of
that income to the shareholder.
In Ronan State Bank v. Commissioner,66 the banking corporation
participated through the state bankers association in a group credit-life
and health insurance program. The policy designated the various
financial institutions as "participating creditors" or policy holders
under the policy. The policy terms were such that the participating
creditor (the Bank) performed the duties of, and received remuneration
similar to that which would normally be received by, an insurance
agent selling a policy. In that capacity, the bank paid the premiums on
the policy, solicited enrollment of the bank's debtors under the group
policy, charged the debtors the appropriate fee and collected those
amounts and issued certificates of insurance under the group policy.
The two controlling shareholders of the bank, believing that local law
prohibited the bank from engaging in the insurance business, caused
the corporation to "assign the insurance business to them."67 The
shareholders, who were licensed insurance agents, individually re-
64. See Fox v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 271 (1938); Laughton v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A.
101 (1939).
65. That is, not only was there no employment contract, but there was, in fact, no employ-
ment relationship. The controlling shareholders were acting on their own in furnishing the man-
agement services to the bank, and thus they should be taxed on the income received by the
corporation for those services.
66. 62 T.C. 27 (1974).
67. The insurance companies never appointed either of the individuals as an agent, and the
terms of the group policy did not allow payment to be made to anyone other than the corporate
policyholder. The income distributed to the shareholders was generated through the bank's par-ticipation in the group policy as a participating creditor and did not represent agents' commissions
earned by them on the sale of insurance.
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ported their respective shares of the income generated by the corpora-
tion's participation in the group policy.
The Commissioner determined that the individual shareholders had
earned the income in question under the assignment of income doc-
trine.68 There was no challenge made under the sham doctrine nor was
Section 482 utilized.
The Tax Court determined that the purported assignment of the in-
surance business to the shareholders was "wholly lacking substance"
because the corporation was never relieved of its liabilities under the
policy as participating creditor, its activities were never assumed by the
individuals, and all essential services with respect to the policies contin-
ued to be performed by employees of the bank after the purported as-
signment. Thus, since the corporation retained all of its rights and
liabilities under the group policy and continued to perform the activi-
ties required of a participating creditor under the policies, the corpora-
tion was clearly in control of the enterprise or the capacity to produce
the income, and thus it was the "true earner" of the income in
question.69
In Jones v. Commissioner,70 the individual was an official court re-
porter for the United States District Court.7" In 1967, the taxpayer was
assigned as court reporter for a major anti-trust case. As a result of the
demands of that case, his income rose dramatically. Thus, in 1968 he
formed a corporation to engage in the court reporting business. The
corporation operated the business in exactly the same fashion as it had
68. 62 T.C. 27 (1974).
69. Cf. Shaw v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 375 (1972). Shaw involved a challenge based on the
assignment of income doctrine alone. The taxpayer was the sole or controlling shareholder of the
three automobile dealerships. He was also a licensed insurance agent in the jurisdiction. He
entered into contracts with several insurance companies authorizing the sale of personal life insur-
ance, credit-life insurance and other insurance policies to the clients of the automobile agencies.
The policies were sold at each of the automobile dealerships through unlicensed "closers" at the
time the automobiles were purchased. The shareholder's name, however, was entered on the pol-
icy forms as the selling agent. All of the work with respect to processing the individual policies
was handled by employees of the respective automobile agencies and all costs related to the sale of
the insurance was born by the agency. These costs were not separately accounted for on the books
of the corporation. The Commission checks were received from the insurance companies directly
by the individual shareholder. He, however, endorsed them over to the account of, and they were
reported as income by, the corporation through which the particular policy had been generated.
The court found that the shareholder was himself in the insurance business and used the corpora-
tions as his agents in carrying out his business of selling insurance. Notwithstanding the substan-
tial quantum of effort expended in servicing the policies by employees of the corporations, the
court determined the commission income in question was includable in the gross income of the
shareholder. With respect to the amount of income so includable, the court determined that only
25% of the income derived by the corporations from the insurance enterprise (after deducting
expenses properly related thereto) should be allocated to the shareholder. The dissenting judge
felt that the corporations had in fact carried on the insurance activities, and that they, not the
controlling shareholder, should be taxed on the income in question.
70. 64 T.C. 1066 (1975).
71. The statute authorizing court reporters requires that the appointee be an individual, and
that only that person may supply the certifications necessary to make trial transcripts official.
Pacifc Law Journal / Vol. 13
been operated prior to incorporation.72 The corporation paid no salary
to its shareholder-employee, however, it paid him bonuses in two years
and lent him a substantial sum in the third. There was no employment
contract between the shareholder-employee and his corporation.
The Commissioner attacked this arrangement, seeking to have a por-
tion of the net income of the corporation reported as gross income by
its sole shareholder. The Commissioner based his contention on Sec-
tion 61, arguing both the sham doctrine and the assignment of income
doctrine. In the alternative, he argued that an allocation was required
under Section 482.
The Tax Court determined that although the corporation was organ-
ized solely for tax purposes, it did engage in substantial business func-
tions and thus was not a sham. The court also determined that,
because the statute required the shareholder personally to prepare and
sell transcripts and that without his certification they were not official,
the shareholder was the "true earner" of the income. The court noted
that the lack of an employment contract gave the shareholder freedom
to funnel income either through the corporation or elsewhere at his
whim. Since the individual shareholder was the court reporter, only he
could earn the income from those services. Thus, the courts sustained
the Commissioner's determination under Section 61(a).73
In Foglesong v. Commissioner,4 (hereinafter referred to as Foglesong
I) the taxpayer was an independent manufacturer's representative sell-
ing steel tubing. After operating as a sole proprietor for a number of
years, he formed a corporation in which he held 98 out of 100 shares.
After forming the corporation, the shareholder-employer contacted the
two steel fabricating companies for whom he was a representative and
asked them to change his sales agreement to reflect the existence of the
corporation. The tubing companies agreed to this change orally, and at
a later date, both entered into contracts with the corporation. It was
clear that the tubing companies wanted the benefit of Foglesong's sales-
manship and not the contractual obligations of the newly-formed cor-
poration. During two of the four years in question, the shareholder
was the sole employee of the corporation, and in the other two years,
the corporation employed a secretary. However, at all times, 98% of
72. There was no expansion by turning to new areas of endeavor, and the corporation con-
fined itself to providing the support services required by the sole shareholder's duties. The share-
holder-employee did not execute any written assignment of any of his rights as the court reporter
to the corporation nor did the corporation assume the responsibility for performing any of his
functions as a court reporter. The 1000 shares of outstanding common stock were held by the
taxpayer and his spouse as joint tenants.
73. The court also sustained the Commissioner's allocation to the sole shareholder, on the
basis of Section 482, of all the income received by the corporation. See note 114, infra.
74. 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1309 (1976), rem'd, 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980) (Foglesong 1).
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the income received by the corporation was allocated to the sales activ-
ity of its shareholder-employee.75 The corporation followed the usual
corporate formalities and paid all the expenses incurred in connection
with the sales activities, carried insurance coverage and maintained a
company automobile. The duties and responsibilities of the share-
holder-employee with respect to sales of steel tubing were identical
both prior to and after creation of the corporation. The corporation
and shareholder did not enter into any contract of employment, nor
was there a covenant not to compete with the corporation. During one
of the years in question, the corporation paid no salary to its share-
holder-employee for the last four months of the year apparently in an
effort to stabilize his taxable income for that year. Additionally, the
corporation never paid dividends on its common stock, although it paid
dividends totalling $38,000 on the preferred stock held by the children
of the shareholder-employee.76
The Commissioner contended that there had been an assignment of
income from the shareholder-employee to the corporation so that the
income ought to be taxable to the shareholder-employee under Section
61. In the alternative, the Commissioner sought to allocate the income
to the shareholder-employee pursuant to Section 482. There was no
contention that the corporation was a "sham."
After stating the basic prerequisites of the assignment of income doc-
trine, the Tax Court turned to an extensive discussion of the share-
holder-employee's motive in forming the corporation,7 7 concluding
that tax avoidance considerations far outweighed any genuine business
concerns the taxpayer may have had in forming the corporation. The
significance of this discussion of tax avoidance is its complete lack of
relevance as there was no sham issue involved in Foglesong I. The
question under the assignment of income doctrine is not "why the tax-
payer chose to assign the income," but rather, "whether he did so."
Turning to the assignment of income issue, the court determined that
control of the income had remained with the shareholder-employee, so
that the income was taxable to him. The court noted that virtually all
of the corporation's income was generated by the sales activities of its
shareholder-employee and went on to conclude:
75. The corporation's sole source of income was sales commissions, however, the court allo-
cated 2% of the income to the exclusive territorial rights held by the corporation.
76. The preferred stock for which the taxpayer had paid only $400 was given to him by his
minor children shortly after the formation of the corporation.
77. The taxpayer testified that he wanted to incorporate his business in order to obtain lim-
ited liability protection afforded by a corporation, and also to prove a better vehicle for his
planned expansion into several new business ventures. There was no business expansion con-
ducted during the years in question, and apparently no efforts were expended in this direction.
The Tax Court did not believe the testimony with regard to the purpose for incorporation.
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There was never a written employment contract or a covenant not to
compete between petitioner and Foglesong Co., and, thus, he had
complete control over the corporation's financial fate and could have
set up a separate business and ceased working for Foglesong Co. al-
together without any recourse or repercussions from his
corporation.78
THE COURT OF APPEALS CASES
The Laughton case79 is frequently cited for the proposition that
"loan-out" arrangements will result in taxable income only to the cor-
poration because there is no assignment of income involved. 0 In fact,
the Court of Appeals did not affirm on that point! The opinion only
supported the Board's determination that the corporation qua corpora-
tion was not a sham. The case was remanded for a finding on the as-
signment of income issue. The Board had seen "no occasion to apply
the doctrine,"''8 but the Court of Appeals saw the issue differently. The
Court of Appeals questioned whether the corporation was being used
to effect "a transfer of assets (here Laughton's services), with a reten-
tion of their control, solely to reduce tax liability."8 2 The issue was
stated as whether the shareholder-employee's employment by the cor-
poration at a salary substantially less than the corporation received for
the "loan-out" of his services constituted, in effect, a single transaction
by the shareholder-employee in which he received indirectly the larger
sum paid by the third parties to the corporation? 3 Since the Board had
not considered this issue, the case was remanded for further findings.
There is no further report of the case-it was apparently settled by stip-
ulation after the remand.84
Thirty years passed before another Court of Appeals examined the
application of the assignment of income doctrine to the situation of the
"one-man" personal service corporation. In Rubin Hj,5 a panel of the
78. 35 T.C.M. at 1314. This is the same conclusion reached in Rubin 1. In view of its finding
on the assignment of income issue, the Tax Court did not make any allocation based on Section
482.
79. 113 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1940).
80. See e.g., Rubin v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 257, 266-67; American Savings Bank v. Com-
missioner, 56 T.C. 828, 841 (which treated both Fox and Laughlon as supporting this statement);
Battle, supra note 7, at 804; Burdett, supra note 7, at 331-32.
81. 40 B.T.A. 101, 107 (1939).
82. 113 F.2d at 104. This statement is very close to an exposition of the income-generating
property branch of the assignment of income doctrine. See note I I infra. However, the court's
statement of the issue on remand frames an inquiry consistent with the personal service income
branch of the doctrine.
83. Id. See Roubik v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 365, 1378 (1969); Rubin v. Commissioner, 51
T.C. 257, 264 (1968) (Rubin I); Kauder, supra note 7, at 1125.
84. Bittker, Professional Associations and Federal Income Tax, 17 TAX. L. REv. 1 (1962).
85. 429 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1970).
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Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Friendly, held that ". . . 'com-
mon law' doctrines of taxation [e.g., the assignment of income doctrine]
and the broad sweep of Section 61 ...have no place where, as here,
there is a statutory provision [Section 482] adequate to deal with the
problem presented."8 6 The court characterized the assignment of in-
come doctrine as a "blunt tool" which did not require analysis of the
facts in terms of the competing policies of the graduated income tax on
one hand and the separate tax existence of corporations on the other
hand. The court, referring to the tension between these policies in the
context of the personal service corporation, deemed the "practical ef-
fect" of application of the assignment of income doctrine to be disre-
gard of the existence of the corporation,87 that is, treatment of the
corporation as a "sham." That position, of course, completely ignores
the valid theoretical distinctions between the "sham" doctrine and the
assignment of income doctrine. The "practical effect" analysis proves
too much for, under it, no income splitting between these two taxable
persons (corporation and shareholder-employee) will ever result in a
prohibited assignment of income. In this regard, the court was further
disturbed by what it deemed the inflexible all-or-nothing result under
the assignment of income doctrine. The Tax Court, however, does allo-
cate income in accordance with the actual earning thereof.88
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the Tax Court's grounds for
distinguishing Fox on the basis of (1) the exclusive employment con-
tract there present and (2) the control over both the "lending" and the
"borrowing" corporations present in Rubin I. The court felt that, even
though the first distinction was factually incorrect, 89 neither distinction
was relevant to the assignment of income doctrine. The court's opinion
is weakened by its virtual ignorance of the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Laughton90 and by its total lack of rationale for the preemption of the
assignment of income doctrine by Section 482. The court failed to rec-
ognize the acceptance of the assignment of income approach by the
Laughton court, and thus it did not attempt to render its opinion con-
sistent with that earlier decision.
In Foglesong v. Commissioner91 (hereinafter referred to as Foglesong
86. Id. at 653.
87. Id. at 652 n.3.
88. Shaw v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 375, 386-87, (1972); Foglesong v. Commissioner, 35
T.C.M. (CCH) 1309 (1976) (Foglesong 1); Blend, Froblems Arising From Imputation of Income,
N.Y.U. 35TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 637, (1977).
89. Review of the facts found by the Tax Court in Rubin I indicates that the distinction is
correct as there was no such contract in Rubin.
90. 113 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1980). The court of appeal in Rubin il cites the Laughton opinion
only for the point that there may be complete disregard of the corporation where it is a "sham."
91. 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980) (Foglesong II).
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I1) a split panel of the Seventh Circuit followed the Second Circuit's
lead in holding that it was "inappropriate" to apply the assignment of
income doctrine where Section 482 was applicable. In so holding, the
court stated ". . . there is no need to crack walnuts with a sledge-
hammer."92 Once again, the taxpayer succeeded in having the issue
determined in the guise of the sham doctrine. The court noted "to app-
ly Lucas v. Earl [to question the validity of a transaction purportedly
entered into by the corporation] under the circumstances present here is
effectively (and more realistically) to nullify the determination that the
corporation is a viable, taxable entity . . ."93 Whenever the issue is
framed in terms of the sham doctrine, the policy of the law favoring
recognition of a corporation as a separate taxable person appears to
control over all other policies. However, to decide the corporation is a
separate taxable person is to open (not foreclose) the issue of assign-
ment of income.9" The Ninth Circuit recognized this distinction in
Laughton.95 The Foglesong II opinion 96 cites to this portion of the
Laughton opinion apparently without comprehension of the meaning
of the Ninth Circuit's action. In this regard, the insidious effect of the
Tax Court's irrelevant digression into the tax avoidance motives of the
shareholder-employee is clear because the Seventh Circuit apparently
felt that the assignment of income issue was to be determined on the
basis of a weighing of "business purposes" against "tax purposes." The
court notes three times the inappropriateness of such an exercise. 97 The
assignment of income doctrine, properly applied, disregards motive
and looks only to effects. The Tax Court, in fact, found the forbidden
effect.
The Court of Appeals considered the shareholder-employee's lack of
outside employment during the period in question to be the equivalent
of an exclusive employment contract. Thus, it distinguished such Tax
Court cases as Rubin i98 and American Savings Bank.99 In so doing,
the court characterized the Tax Court's requirement of an employment
contract to avoid assignment of income treatment as an "elevation of
form over substance."' 00 The court felt that it was not possible to es-
92. Id. at 872.
93. Id. at 869.
94. Jones v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1066, 1076 (1975).
95. 113 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1940).
96. 621 F.2d at 870, n.12.
97. Id. at 869, 872-73.
98. 51 T.C. 251 (1968) (Rubin I).
99. 56 T.C. 828 (1971). The dissenting judge on the Seventh Circuit panel characterized the
Fogesong case succinctly: "[t]his corporation is nothing more than a few incorporating papers
lying in a desk drawer of no significance except when a tax return is due." Foglesong v. Commis-
sioner, 621 F.2d 865, 873 (7th Cir. 1980) (Foglesong II).
100. 621 F.2d at 872.
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tablish an enforceable legal obligation between a sole shareholder-em-
ployee and his personal service corporation which would require him
to work exclusively for that corporation. The "deal" made with him-
self could be undone at will.
The Court of Appeals also distinguished prior Tax Court cases on
the issue of control by the shareholder-employee over both the loan-out
corporation and the borrowers of his services. 1' It was correct to do
so. Control over ultimate recipient of the services is not relevant under
any approach used. For example, under the assignment of income doc-
trine, the relevant control is over the earning of the income, and the
parties compared are the shareholder-employee and the corporation
which "lends" his services and receives compensation therefore. The
borrowing corporation which actually receives the services and pays
the loan-out corporation for them is, simply, outside of the analysis.
THE RATIONALE FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME DOCTRINE
The assignment of income doctrine is the "cornerstone of our gradu-
ated income tax system."' 02 This is because, for example, one taxpayer
with taxable income of $50,000 pays over 50% more total tax than two
taxpayers who each have $25,000 of taxable income. 0 3 A "black-let-
ter" statement of the doctrine is simple: the party whose efforts or as-
sets generate the income in question is taxable on it regardless of its
actual receipt by another in accordance with a contract or otherwise,
i.e., income is taxed to him who earns it."° The problem lies in
determining who is providing the assets or efforts. In the case of a
closely-held personal service corporation, the issue is complicated by
the fact that the corporation can act only through agents and those
agents are also its controlling shareholders. The identity is absolute in
the sole shareholder situation. In American Savings Bank, the court
stated:
The more difficult question, often shrouded in confusion, is the de-
termination of who, in fact, is the real earner of the income. This
determination is made no easier by tax laws that permit the concep-
tually difficult arrangement where an individual performs services
thereby earning the income that is received, and the next day per-
forms the same services and the compensation, when paid to a corpo-
101. Id. at 870.
102. United States v. Bayse, 410 U.S. 441, 450 (1973).
103. Compare the various rates contained in the Tax Rate Schedules of I.R.C. §§1, 11. In
addition to the lower total tax because of rate-splitting between individuals at many income levels,
the corporate rate is lower than the individual rate, so diversion of income to a corporation results
in an even lower tax bill.
104. McIver v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 719, 722 (1977).
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ration wholly owned by that individual, is said to have been earned
by the corporation. The patent artificiality of such a situation leads
this Court to carefully scrutinize any such arrangement to assure that
an individual is not merely siphoning off income to another entity at
the expense of the public fisc.1
0 5
In determining who is the "true earner," the Tax Court looks beyond
who has apparent control over the proceeds to see who has control over
the earning of the income. To do so, the court seeks to identify who
had control of the source of the income, more precisely, who was in
control of the enterprise or the capacity to produce income. 10 6 The
form of the Tax Court's assignment of income doctrine is greatly influ-
enced by the conclusions of Lyon and Eustice. In an article, those
scholars state:
The distinction in these [personal service assignment of income] cases
is grounded on the question of who has the ultimate direction and
control over the earning of this compensation. If such control lies
with the taxpayer who actually performs the services, then he re-
mains taxable on the earnings from his personal services, whether or
not he chooses to divert the receipt of that compensation to a third
party. However, if the direction and control of the performer's activ-
ities resides in a superior authority, and the consideration paid for
the performance of those services is made to the person having such
ultimate direction and control, then the mere fact that the taxpayer
has performed the services does not render him taxable on the
amount paid for these services.
10 7
Exploration of the Tax Court cases reveals that control over the earn-
ing of the income is reduced, in practice, to the question of whether
there is a written exclusive employment contract and perhaps, a cove-
nant not to compete.108 The analysis of cases contained in Table I il-
lustrates this conclusion with respect to the cases which find assignment
of income to be present. Without an employment contract, the share-
holder-employee is free to provide his services to third parties either
directly or through the corporation, thus retaining the ability to choose
the alternative which minimizes his total tax burden. Since the one-
man personal service corporation has no independent earning capacity
(such as other employees or assets), the shareholder-employee is in a
position to control its income flow.'0 9 However, as the Court of Ap-
105. American Savings Bank v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 828, 839 (1971).
106. Ronan State Bank v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 27 (1974).
107. Lyon & Eustice,Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P. G. Lake Case,
17 TAX L. REV. 293, 393 (1962) (author's footnotes omitted).
108. Foglesong v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1309, 1314 (1976) (Foglesong 1); Jones v.
Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1066, 1074 (1975); Battle, supra note 7, at 805; Rubin v. Commissioner, 51
T.C. 251, 267 (1968) (Rubin I).
109. Foglesong v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1309 (1976) (Foglesong I). In Realty Set-
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peals pointed out in Foglesong II, an employment contract between a
shareholder-employee and his controlled corporation is unlikely to re-
flect a real, enforceable bargain.' Thus, the assignment of income
question, in practice, turns on a trivial, formalistic requirement."' The
Tax Courts' search for form over substance has resulted in nothing
more than a trap for the unwary. Many commentators thus regard
slavish adherence to form as the ultimate defense to the assignment of
income doctrine attack on the personal service corporation." 2
With this analysis of the dichotomy between the Tax Court's verbal
rubric and its actual practice, the frustration with the assignment of
income doctrine so clearly present in the Courts of Appeal opinions in
Rubin II and Foglesong II becomes more understandable.'1 3 The as-
signment of income doctrine is a valuable and important tool for the
Commissioner and the courts in safeguarding the integrity of the pro-
gressive tax rate structure. However, the incongruity between theory
and application, in this instance, is simply too great to ignore. The
failure of the Tax Court to develop a factual rationale based on sub-
stantial economic effects for the application of the assignment of in-
come doctrine makes rational prediction of its application impossible.
The courts are reduced to deciding important financial questions on the
basis of trivial formalities. Therefore, the appellate courts have aban-
doned the assignment of income doctrine as "inappropriate" in the per-
sonal service corporation cases and sought refuge from the
"sledgehammer" by requiring the application of Section 482.
tlement Corp. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 569, 573 (1980), the court stated that a "tax-
payer may not avoid his tax liability by the simple expedient of drawing up legal papers assigning
income which he has earned to another." See Burdett, supra note 7, at 334; Katz, Can Section 482
Be Used to Negate the Tax Effect ofa Bona Fide Corporation?, 28 J. TAx 2, 3 (1968).
110. Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865, 872 (7th Cir. 1980) (Foglesong II).
111. Even if the assignment of income issue is viewed through the medium of the income-
producing property line of cases, with the employment contract seen as the property owned by the
corporation, the determination would still turn on a formality (as there can be no arm's length
bargaining) and not on any substantial economic effect. See generaly Helvering v. Horst, 1I
U.S. 112 (1940); Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of Income.: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P.G.
Lake Case, 17 TAx. L. REV. 293, 327-45 (1962). In the context of the "family partnership," an
income-producing property approach has proven effective to combat assignments of income
among partners where the partners own "a capital interest" in a partnership "in which capital is a
material income-producing factor." I.R.C. §704(e). See Blount, Family Partnershos: Who Must
Recognize the Taxable Income, 44 Mo. L. REV. 217 (1979). In the personal service corporation,
however, capital is not a material factor in the production of income.
112. See Battle, supra note 7, at 805; Blend, Problems Arising From Imputation of Income,
N.Y.U. 35TH INST. ON FED. TAX, 637, 650 (1980); Burdett, supra note 7, at 336; 19 KAN. L. REV.
348 (1971).
113. The Courts of Appeal have been hindered in their review by the almost universal pres-
ence of the sham theory in these cases. In some instances, that issue has been interjected by the
taxpayer's counsel where the Commissioner has not argued it. Except in the most egregious cases,
the presence of the sham theory serves merely to obscure the assignment of the income issue. The
temptation is strong once a valid, separate taxable person has been found to resist all efforts to
examine the operations of that entity. The same obscuring effect results from gratuitous tirades
concerning tax avoidance motives such as that present in Foglesong I at 313.
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THE SECTION 482 APPROACH
Section 4821' broadly authorizes the Commissioner to allocate in-
come among commonly controlled organizations, trades or businesses
whenever necessary to clearly reflect the income of any of the entities.
It has been described as an amalgam of several important themes and
policies of the tax law: "tax avoidance principles, assignment of in-
come notions, . . . and clear reflection of income under the parties'
accounting methods.""' 5 Use of Section 482 provides the Commis-
sioner with formidable tactical advantages. In addition to the usual
presumption of correctness accompanying the Commissioner's determi-
nation,"'6 the Commissioner's exercise of administrative discretion will
be sustained unless arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable."17 In the per-
sonal service corporation area, the application of Section 482 raises sig-
nificant issues in two areas: whether there are two or more
organizations, trades or businesses and what criteria should be applied
to determine the proper allocation of income between the two
organizations.
With respect to the separate trade or business requirement, the anal-
ysis of the courts concerning what circumstances distinguish the tax-
payer's trade or business from his mere shareholder status, has been
described as "fuzzy [and] conclusionary"1 8 [sic], "imaginative" '" 9 and
the product of "some rather circuitous reasoning."' 20 This question,
relating to a prerequisite for the application of Section 482, is discussed
in this article only because of the courts' use of the assignment of in-
come doctrine "to the limited extent of supporting the existence of a
trade or business on the part of the shareholder who purportedly acts as
a corporate employee in conducting his business affairs."''
114. I.R.C. §482 provides:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades or businesses (whether or not incorpo-
rated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not affiliated)
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary may dis-
tribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between
or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines that such distribu-
tion, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or
clearly to reflect the income of any such organizations, trades, or businesses.
The legislative history of Section 482 is set forth in B. Forman Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d
1144, 1150-151 (2d Cir. 1972) (rev'g 54 T.C. 912 (1970)).
115. Eustice, supra note 9, at 483.
116. U.S. TAx CT. R. PtAc. & P. 142 (1979).
117. Eustice, supra note 9, at 494.
118. Burdett, supra note 7, at 333.
119. Battle, supra note 7, at 805-06.
120. Egerton, Reallocation ofIncome: A New Threat to Professional Service Corporations?, 58
A.B.A. J. 979, 981 (1972).
121. Rubin v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1155 (1971) (Rubin III). Accord Borge v. Commis-
sioner, 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968) (aft'g 26 T.C.M. 816 (1967)).
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In Arch v. Commissioner, the factors which the court cited to support
its finding of a separate business were the familiar ones:
the corporation did not receive the taxpayer's right to services; there
was no contract of employment between them; and she in fact ren-
dered her services to the corporation voluntarily without compensa-
tion. Nor did the corporation receive a covenant not to compete
from [her]. For aught that appears, in the absence of a covenant not
to compete, she could readily have established a competing business
that might well have rendered [the corporation] worthless ....
This approach was adopted by the Tax Court in Rubin III where the
court noted that "the effect of the transactions is to channel income
generated 23 by petitioner through his performance of management
services for Dorman Mills to a controlled corporation."' 24 Thus it held
that:
where the particular facts of a case are such as to justify a finding
that a shareholder operated an independent business and merely as-
signed to the corporation a portion of the income therefrom, the
business activity of the taxpayer may constitute a trade or business to
which allocation of all or part of the income attributable to his efforts
is authorized under section 482.125
The parallel to the assignment of income doctrine used, but disap-
proved, in Rubin I is striking. In its affirming opinion, 26 the Second
Circuit stated: "[i]t was the shareholder-employee's special ability that
Dorman Mills wanted, and it wanted nothing else from [the corpora-
tion]. . . . This is enough to constitute his rendition of services. . . a
trade or business."127 A consideration of the assignment of income
doctrine, thus, is essential in determining the applicability of Section
482.
The assignment of income doctrine, the cases reveal, is the basis for
the allocation of income authorized by Section 482. The Regulations
mandate that the allocation shall place the controlled entity on a tax
parity with uncontrolled entities by determining the "true taxable in-
122. Ach v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114, 124-125 (1964), af'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1966).
123. When the Court uses the term "generated," it is apparent that the meaning is the same as
"earned" (the term generally used in the assignment of income cases).
124. Rubin v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1155, 1159 (1971) (Rubin III).
125. Id. at 1161.
126. 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972) (aygper curiam 56 T.C. 1155 (1971) (Rubin IV)).
127. Id. at 1218. Burdett, supra note 7, at 334, analyzes this statement in the following pas-
sage: "Perhaps Judge Friendly was saying that Rubin, like Arch, did not transfer all of the busi-
ness assets, i.e., 100% of his personal services through an exclusive employment agreement to his
PSC [See Cooper v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 576 (1975)], and, therefore, was in a position to deal
directly with the borrower who wanted his 'special ability.' In that context, Judge Friendly may
have been saying that the borrower wanted Rubin's 'special ability,' and it was Rubin's, not the
PSC's, right to provide it. If so, the opinion is understandable. A nonexclusive agreement would
permit the individual to control the production of the income from his services so that he could
direct income both to the PSC and to himself." Id. (annotation added).
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come"' 28 from the property and business of the controlled taxpayer
(i.e., the personal service corporation). The standard is that of an un-
controlled taxable person dealing at arm's length with another uncon-
trolled taxable person.' 29 Uncontrolled taxpayers do not include in
their gross income amounts which have been "earned" by another tax-
payer. The "true taxable income" test is inconsistent with the artificial
channeling of income from one taxable person to another. As Eustice
states:
[t]he reallocation rules of section 482 seem to be strongly infused
with assignment of income notions: while not identical in scope or
outlook, these two approaches nevertheless often involve parallel
considerations. Thus, a major issue in many section 482 cases is
whether a particular taxpayer has in substance earned the income in
question. This in turn often depends on whether such taxpayer is a
viable business entity;... "'
In Jordan v. Commissioner,3' the Tax Court upheld the Commis-
sioner's allocation of all income received by the corporation to its
shareholder-employee. The income arose from a contract to provide
management services to an insurance company. The shareholder-em-
ployee was the corporation's only employee, and he provided all the
services. There was no employment contract between the shareholder-
employee and his controlled corporation. Thus, the court found the
effect of the transaction to be a mere channeling of "income earned by
petitioner to a corporation under his control."' 2 The corporation
never had control over the activities of the shareholder in the perform-
ance of the services generating the income received by it.
The Courts of Appeal in Rubin II and Foglesong i held that Section
482 preempted the common law doctrines under Section 61. Those
courts were seeking a "more precise" device 133 for dealing with the is-
sue of the proper taxpayer in the personal service corporation context.
The end result, however, is that while the statutory basis has changed,
the courts have ended up asking the same question: "who earned the
income?"' 134 And the answer has been found by the same analysis: the
128. Treas. Reg. §1.482-1(a)(6) (1968).
129. Treas. Reg. §1.482-1(b)(1) (1968). Specfc rules are provided for allocations of income in
the family partnership and the Subchapter S corporation contexts to prevent assignment of income
among the two or more partners or shareholders. See I.R.C. §§704(e)(1), 1375(c). These rules,
however, operate only to allocate income among the partners or shareholders; not to allocate it
between the entity and the individuals whose efforts have generated that income. See Comment,
Income Shifting through a Subchapter S Corporation, 37 MD. L. REv. 809 (1978).
130. Eustice, supra note 9, at 460. See also 492.
131. 60 T.C. 872 (1973).
132. Id. at 883.
133. Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865, 872 (Foglesong II).
134. See Burdett, supra note 7, at 335.
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assignment of income doctrine. The courts, therefore, have not escaped
the formalism to which the assignment of income doctrine leads in the
personal service corporation cases.
CONCLUSION
The Internal Revenue Service challenges to the use of the personal
service corporation have continued for over forty years under many
approaches.' 35 The Service is appropriately concerned with what may
be viewed as discretionary rate-splitting and conversion of ordinary in-
come to capital gains. 136 If the taxpayer can freely direct the flow of
income either to himself or through a second taxable person so as to
reduce his total tax burden, the Congressional policy supporting a
graduated income tax is severely undercut.
The courts have responded to these challenges by applying legal con-
cepts which seem to fall into a hierarchy of analytical sophistication-
sham doctrine, assignment of income doctrine, Section 482. Review of
the cases, however, reveals that the analytical sophistication is illusory.
The sham doctrine has such a low threshold for compliance that it is
useful only in the most outrageous situations. Application of the as-
signment of income doctrine is dependent on the presence or absence
135. In addition to the sham and assignment of income doctrines and the allocation power
provided by Section 482, the professional service corporation may be subject to challenge on other
grounds. See generally Eaton, Professional Corporations andAssociations in Prospective, 23 TAX L.
REV. 1, 24-25 (1967).
I. Whether the required employment relationship exists between the corporation and the service
provider for purposes of deferred compensation arrangements. See Burdett, supra note 7, at
335.
2. Whether the corporation will be subject to the personal holding company penalty tax of I.R.C.
§541. See text accompanying note 143, infra. Lee, Personal Holding Company Status: Hidden
Dangers/or Service Corporations and Corporations in Transition, N.Y.U. 38TH INST. ON FED.
TAX. 8-1 (1980). In Rubin I, the Tax Court held that the existence of Section 543(a)(7) did
not preclude attack on other grounds such as the assigi ment of income doctrine or Section
482. Rubin v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 251, 268 (1968) (Rubin I) (the later Court of Appeal
decision supports this holding as to Section 482). Accord Borge v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d
673, 666-667 (2d Cir. 1968).
3. Whether deductions or credits taken by the corporation may be disallowed pursuant to I.R.C.
§269(a). This section was applied in tandem with Section 482 in Borge v. Commissioner, 405
F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968) and Arch v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 114 (1964). See general y Watts,
Acquisitions Made to Avoid Taxes, 34 TAX L. REV. 539 (1979).
4. Whether the corporation is formed or availed of to accumulate excess earnings at lower corpo-
rate tax rates so as to be subject to the penalty tax of I.R.C. §53 1. Seegenerally Cunningham,
More Than You Ever Wanted to Know About the Accumulated Earnings Tax, 6 J. CORP. TAX
187 (1979).
136. Earnings may be left in the corporation at a tax rate as low as 16%, I.R.C. §1 l(b)(l), up to
a total accumulation of $250,000 with no business justification at all, I.R.C. §535(c)(2). Since the
maximum tax rate on individuals is 50%, I.R.C. §1(c)(1), 33% of the corporation's taxable income
can be sheltered from immediate taxation (subject to the penalty tax of Section 531) and con-
verted, by subsequent corporate liquidation or sale of stock, into capital gains income taxable to
the shareholder at an effective rate of 20%. See I.R.C. §1202. The minimum accumulation for
personal service corporations in such fields as health, law and performing arts is limited to
$150,000. This reflects the tax law changes effective for taxable years beginning in 1982.
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of an employment contract. That document, in this context, is a mere
formality. The application of Section 482 in the personal service cor-
poration context also reduces to reliance on that same formality be-
cause the key concept of "true taxable income" is dependent on the
application of assignment of income principles.
The Commissioner's attempt to deal withprofessional personal serv-
ice corporations by denying them status as corporations under section
7701(a)(3) was defeated in 1969. t17 A series of Court of Appeals deci-
sions established that incorporation under state corporation statutes
was sufficient to comply with the Internal Revenue Code definition of
"corporation." 138
So long as there is recognition of the corporate status of the personal
service corporation, especially in the one-man situation, any attempt to
control the taxpayer's allocation of income between the corporation
and its shareholder-employee is foredoomed to rest ultimately on mere
formalities. Such a corporation does not possess the economic attrib-
utes of a corporation-packaging of efforts, pooling of investment and
sharing of risk.'3 9 Thus, there cannot be a substantial economic basis
for determining the income earned by the corporation. There being no
economic substance, form must triumph.
The conclusion which must be reached is that the problem of free-
choice rate-splitting presented by the personal service corporation can-
not be effectively resolved either by treasury regulations or by judicial
doctrines. As the Court of Appeals noted in Foglesong II:
137. In 1965, the Commissioner issued an amendment to Treasury Regulation Section
301.7701-2(h) designed to prevent achievement of corporate status for federal tax purposes by
professional personal service corporations by characterizing such organizations as outside the stat-
utory definition which provides: CORPORATION. The term "corporation" includes associa-
tions, joint-stock companies and insurance companies. I.R.C. §7701(a)(3). After an unbroken
series of losses, the Commissioner conceded the issue of status as a "corporation" in T.I.R. 1019,
[1969] 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) §6867 (Aug. 8, 1969), and the 1965 Amendments to the
Regulations were withdrawn in 1977 by T.D. 7515, 1977-2 C.B. 482.
138. While none of the cases dealt with a one-man personal service corporation, sound dicta in
those cases appears to foreclose the Commissioner's use of a status argument in this situation as
well. See United States v. Empey, 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969), O'Neill v. United States, 410
F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1966); Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969). After noting that
Section 7701(a) does not specifically provide a category for an incorporated business organization
and that the legislative history provides no in-depth examination of the term "corporation," the
cases state in various ways the conclusion set forth in O'Neill: "It appears clear that the corporate
entity created by state law is the corporation taxed under the Internal Revenue Code" [emphasis
added]. 410 F.2d at 896.
Thus possession of a Certificate of Incorporation issued by state authorities, see note 34 and
accompanying text supra, sufficient to meet the definition of "corporation" provided in Section
770 l(a)(3). See generally Eaton, supra, note 135, at 30; Scallen, Federal Income Taxation of Pro-fessional Associations and Corporations, 49 MINN. L. REv. 603, 622-623 (1965). The state law
"label" of corporations may have imported incidents of real economic significance, when the
predecessor of Section 7701(a)(3) was adopted in the Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, §1, 40 Stat.
1057, but modem state corporation laws no longer perform that function.
139. See general R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, (2d ed. 1977).
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We think that our approach in this case of recognizing some
vitality in personal service corporations accords with congressional
intent. 'A history of legislation targeted at personal service corpora-
tions from corporate taxation and the personal holding company tax
provisions indicate that to some extent Congress has sanctioned the
incorporation of service businesses for tax purposes.' 140
The solution, then, lies in new legislation designed to curb the abuse of
corporate tax status by organizations, such as the one-man personal
service corporation, which do not perform the economic functions
which justify the special treatment accorded to corporations under the
Internal Revenue Code.
The existing personal holding company provisions 141 are designed,
in part, to prevent tax avoidance by the one-man personal service cor-
poration. One commentator describes the problem the Congress
sought to cure as follows:
(2) 'Incorporated Talent.' A highly paid person providing per-
sonal service skills (e.g., an actor) would organize a corporation and
contract to work for it at a relatively small salary. The corporation
would then contract out its employee's services at the market value.
The difference between the amount received by the corporation for
the services of its 'employee' and the salary paid to him would be
taxed at the relatively lower corporate rates.1 42
That is essentially the same problem with which the courts and the
Service have been struggling in the cases reviewed in this article. The
continued need for new approaches is the result of the overly-restrictive
definition of personal services. Such income includes only amounts re-
ceived under a contract by which the corporation is to furnish personal
services if some person other than the corporation has the right to des-
ignate (by name or by description) the individual who is to perform the
services as designated (by name or by description) in the contract. 14
Thus, physicians,'" certified public accountants145 and consultants 46
140. Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865, 873 (7th Cir. 1980), citing Battle, The Use of
Corporations by Persons Who Peqform Services to Gain Tax Advantage, 57 TAXES 797, 802 (1979).
The Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, §200, 40 Stat. 1059 (1919), contained a special classification for
personal service corporations:
The term 'personal service corporation' means a corporation whose income is to be
ascribed primarily to the activities of the principal owner or stockholders in the active
conduct of the affairs of the corporation and in which capital (whether invested or bor-
rowed) is not a material income-producing factor .
Id. Such organizations were treated as partnerships by the Act, Id., ch. 18, §218(e), 40 Stat. 1070
(1919). This special definition was repealed in the Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, §218(d), 42 Stat.
245 (1921). The only remaining reference to it is in I.R.C. §1016(a)(4).
141. I.R.C. §§541-547.
142. D. KAHN, BASIC CORPORATE TAXATION 199 (3d ed. 1981). See generall, BITKER AND
EuSTICE, supra note 18, §8.20.
143. I.R.C. §543(a)(7).
144. Rev. Rule 75-67, 1975-1 C.B. 169.
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have been able to avoid receipt of personal holding company income
while operating one-man corporations.'47 The overly-restrictive nature
of these provisions appears to be an unfortunate result of congressional
attention on specific instances of abuse. 4 ' Section 543(a)(7) could be
amended to read (deletions indicated by strike-throughs):
(7) PERSONAL SERVICE CONTRACTS.-
(A) Amounts received under a contract under which the corpora-
tion is to furnish personal services; if som o n o ther tha...
eorperation has the tight to designate (by name or by decseription) the
individual wh is to perform the s vies, or if the individual who is
to perfo= the sL..,. is dosignated (by name or by d... tFpti) in
thee nt..e and
(B) Amounts received from the sale or other disposition of such a
contract.
This paragraph shall apply with respect to amounts received for
services under a particular contract only if at some time during the
taxable year 25 percent or more in value of the outstanding stock of
the corporation is owned, directly or indirectly, by or for the individ-
ual who has performed, -[or] is to perform, or may be designated (by
name or by dseition) as the one to prfor111, such services.
The extension of the personal holding company provisions would re-
solve the problem caused by the lack of economic criteria for allocating
income in the cases discussed in this article in a straight forward man-
ner without resort to form over substance. It would give legislative
direction for the proper treatment of these personal service
corporations.
145. Rev. Rule 75-250, 1975-1 C.B. 172.
146. Private Ruling 7733052 (May 19, 1977) reprinted in Lee, supra note 135, at 8-12.
147. Where one person performs the crucial income-generating services for the corporation,
specific designation is never needed by the parties. In Rev. Rule 77-336, 1977-2 C.B. 202, the
taxpayer avoided personal holding company income but the Service ruled he was taxable on the
corporation's net income on assignment of income grounds citing Shaw v. Commissioner 59 T.C.
375 (1972). Accord, Foglesong v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1309 (1976) (Foglesong 1).
148. BIr-rKER & EusTcE, supra note 18, §8.20 n.104.
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